I Introduction
The Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013 ('MDMAA') was passed on 17April 2013. The MDMAA amends the Marriage Act 1955 to "clarify that a marriage is between 2 people regardless of their sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity." 1 It therefore makes same-sex marriage legal in New Zealand. While purporting to clarify the definition of marriage, the MDMAA effectively alters what was until now the common law position reflected in Quilter v Attorney General that 'marriage' is between two people of the opposite sex. 2 New Zealand was the thirteenth country to allow same-sex marriage nationwide.
reason. However, section 29(1) cannot be viewed in isolation. Celebrants may be subject to human rights obligations from elsewhere in the law, rendering them unable to refuse to solemnise a marriage if to do so would constitute unlawful discrimination (for example on the grounds of sex or sexual orientation). 5 At the heart of this issue lie two sets of conflicting rights. On one hand, same-sex couples have the right not to be discriminated against based on their sex and/or sexual orientation.
(Note that this paper will refer to the rights of 'couples', rather than 'the individuals within couples' for the sake of simplicity). However, celebrants' religious freedoms, both to hold and to manifest religious beliefs, must also be protected. Both parties' rights are guaranteed in domestic and international law. 6 How then, can these rights be reconciled? Some take the view that:
To say that one supports same-sex marriage, but not a right to marry that is equal to the right straight people enjoy, because it is riddled with exceptions and segregated so as not to offend traditionalist sensibilities, is a support that exists in theory only.
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If the purpose of the MDMAA is to give same-sex couples equal marriage rights, is allowing those with objections to same-sex marriage to refuse to perform such marriages preventing the final step to equality? Conversely, is it arguable that religious freedoms are sufficiently important to justify sanctioning differential treatment in this context? Could achieving absolute equality for same-sex couples at the expense of religious freedoms create a disproportionate burden on celebrants?
The Legislature's response was to insert section 6 into the MDMAA (later becoming section 29(2) of the Marriage Act), amending the Marriage Act to expressly allow some celebrants a religious exemption. 8 Section 29 (2) The scope of the exemption in section 29 (2) is limited however: it does not allow refusal based on the views of the individual celebrant (for example if he or she objects to same-sex marriage even though his or her church or organisation does not), nor does it include all types of celebrants. As a result, a large proportion of celebrants are not covered by the exemption.
These celebrants can therefore only lawfully refuse to solemnise a marriage if section 29 (1) permits it, and it is thus crucial to know the extent of the protection afforded by this provision. This paper therefore focuses on whether section 29(1) of the Marriage Act (without section 29 (2)) allows celebrants to lawfully refuse to solemnise same-sex marriages if solemnising such marriages would contravene the celebrants' religious beliefs.
This paper will show that celebrants exercise a public function when solemnising marriages, and The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) therefore applies to their actions.
It will then conclude that on its proper construction section 29(1) does not override obligations arising from NZBORA. A celebrant may therefore only refuse under section 29(1) if to do so would not contravene NZBORA. Finally, it will conclude that a refusal on religious grounds would be a justifiable limit on a couple's right to freedom from discrimination, and thus lawful under NZBORA. Section 29(1) therefore allows any celebrant to refuse to solemnise a marriage based a legitimate religious objection. This paper will also explore an alternative scenario in which section 29(1) is found, on its proper construction, to exclude rights arising from NZBORA, and determine whether this meaning would be adopted by the courts.
II The Statutory Scheme
All couples wishing to get married must receive a marriage licence from a Registrar, 10 and have their marriage solemnised by either a Registrar or a marriage celebrant. 11 There are three types of celebrant set out in the Marriage Act.
The first type consists of ministers of religion ('ministers') representing any of the ten religious bodies enumerated in Schedule 1 of the Act. 12 The second class consists of 6 celebrants nominated by approved organisations ('organisational celebrants'). 13 The
Registrar-General may allow certain organisations to nominate members to be marriage celebrants if he or she is convinced that at least one of the principal objects of the organisation is to "uphold or promote religious beliefs or philosophical or humanitarian convictions." 14 There are currently nearly 1,000 approved organisations. 15 Thirdly, the Registrar-General may appoint an 'independent celebrant', 16 if the person is of an appropriate character and it is in the general public interest, or that of a particular community (defined by geography, interest, belief or another factor) that this person becomes a celebrant.
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Independent celebrants are excluded from section 29 (2) , and may only refuse if section 29 (1) allows. 18 While the issue of whether Registrars should be able to lawfully refuse to solemnise marriages is worth considering, they are not mentioned in section 29(1), and fall outside the scope of this paper.
III Could a Celebrant Lawfully Refuse to Solemnise a Same-Sex Marriage On Religious Grounds Under Section 29(1)?
To recapitulate, section 29(1) states that "[a] marriage licence shall authorise but not oblige any marriage celebrant to solemnise the marriage to which it relates." 19 As mentioned above, this provision appears to give celebrants discretion to refuse to solemnise any marriage for any reason. However, celebrants are also subject to obligations from elsewhere in the law, including human rights obligations from the Human Rights Act 1993 (HRA) and NZBORA prohibiting unlawful discrimination. These may make a refusal to solemnise a same-sex marriage unlawful. It must therefore be ascertained:
(1) Which human rights obligations apply to celebrants when solemnising marriages;
(2) Whether section 29(1) excludes these obligations; and (3) Whether, if these obligations are not excluded by section 29(1), it is nevertheless lawful for a celebrant to refuse to solemnise a marriage based on religious objection. House of Lords dicta, the fact that this view was adopted in the highest UK court, examining a similar legislative provision, is highly persuasive.
In sum, the courts are likely to hold that celebrants perform a public function when solemnising marriages. NZBORA therefore applies to celebrants' actions in the performance of this function through section 3(b), and they are thus obliged to act consistently with The leading approach to statutory interpretation when human rights are affected is that of the Supreme Court in R v Hansen. The methodology adopted by the majority is as follows:
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(1) Ascertain the "intended" or "ordinary" meaning of the provision.
(2) Determine whether this intended meaning is apparently inconsistent with the relevant right or freedom.
(3) If so, is this apparent inconsistency a justified limit in terms of section 5 of NZBORA?
(4) If the inconsistency is a justified limit, Parliament's intended meaning prevails.
(5) If the inconsistency is not a justified limit, examine the words again under section 6 of NZBORA to ascertain whether it is reasonably possible for a meaning consistent or less inconsistent with the relevant right to be found in them. If so, adopt that meaning.
(6) If it is not reasonably possible to adopt a more consistent meaning, Parliament's intended meaning prevails due to section 4.
To clarify, one must first ascertain the meaning of the provision using traditional principles of statutory interpretation, without reference to the interpretive direction of NZBORA section 6. 56 Once the "intended meaning" is determined, the issue becomes whether this meaning prima facie breaches NZBORA, and if so, whether this breach can be demonstrably justified It has been argued that a reading of section 29(1) that leaves celebrants subject to human rights obligations cannot be Parliament's intended meaning, as this would lead to absurd consequences. 65 For example, a refusal by a Catholic priest to solemnise the marriage of two divorcees, or any refusal based on a prohibited ground of discrimination, would be unlawful. 66 The argument is that a meaning leading to such absurd consequences could not possibly be intended by Parliament. 67 However, this argument was made on the basis that celebrants' actions are not public functions, and thus Part 2 of the HRA applies, rather than NZBORA. On the above analysis of section 3(b) however, this is incorrect. Unlike Part 2 of the HRA, NZBORA provides an additional layer of protection through section 5, 68 and thus these so-called 'absurd' consequences will not arise unless it is also found that the refusal was not demonstrably justifiable under section 5. A section 5 analysis is likely to avoid any absurdity. It therefore cannot be said that section 29(1) requires NZBORA obligations to be excluded in order to prevent absurd results.
Moreover, the wording of section 29(1) is simply not specific enough to suggest that obligations arising from NZBORA are excluded, nor does its context suggest this. More specific wording (for example, "notwithstanding any other provision or enactment, no celebrant shall be obliged to solemnise any marriage") would be required. Finally, it may also be argued that under the 'principle of legality' (a common law presumption that Parliament does not intend to legislate contrary to fundamental human rights, only rebutted by clear wording to the contrary), 69 Parliament cannot be said to have intended to override NZBORA obligations without clear wording to this effect. However, it is unclear whether the Court in
Hansen intended for "value-oriented" methods of interpretation like this to be factored in at the first stage of the Hansen methodology, especially as this may undermine the need for a later section 6 inquiry.
70
Regardless of whether this presumption applies here, the text and purpose of section 29(1) do not specifically exclude NZBORA obligations. The provision therefore only gives celebrants the power to refuse to solemnise a marriage if to do so is consistent with their obligations under NZBORA section 3(b). As this interpretation takes NZBORA obligations into account, it is more consistent with NZBORA rights than the alternative, and will be adopted under the Hansen approach. Nevertheless, this paper will continue the Hansen analysis on the alternative basis that section 29(1) does, on its proper construction, exclude NZBORA obligations, and determine whether this meaning would be adopted by the courts. The rationale for this is two-fold. Firstly, the above conclusion on the meaning of section 29 (1) may be erroneous. Secondly, the following steps will allow valuable exploration of the rights at issue through the remaining Hansen steps.
Is this meaning apparently inconsistent with section 19?
The next question is whether Parliament's intended meaning (assuming in the alternative that section 29(1) does override NZBORA obligations that would otherwise apply to celebrants, 74 Under this approach, "the scope of one right is not to be taken as so broad as to impinge upon and limit others." 75 Thus, the scope of the appellants' right to freedom of religion was defined so as to exclude endangering the health of their children, and the conflicting rights were reconciled without recourse to section 5.
In contrast, the 'contextual balancing' approach defines rights broadly, and leaves the [109] . 80 Rishworth and others The New Zealand Bill of Rights, above n 20, at 56; Bromwich "Should God be expelled from our schools?", above n 77, at 44; Andrew Butler "Limiting Rights" (2002) 33 VUWLR 537 at 542. 81 Butler "Limiting Rights", above n 80, at 543; Quilter v Attorney-General, above n 2, at 576 per Tipping J; Bromwich "Should God be expelled from our schools?", above n 77, at 44. 82 Ministry of Health v Atkinson, above n 73, at [109] .
same-sex couple) did so merely because the marriage was not valid under the Marriage Act, rather than based on the couple's sex or sexual orientation. 83 However, in the author's opinion, this refusal was still based on the fact that the couple were of the same sex, as is the celebrant's refusal in the above example.
Moreover, Tipping and Thomas JJ disagreed with Gault J, holding that the prohibition of same-sex marriage constitutes differentiation based on sexual orientation. 84 Both focussed on the impact of the prohibition on same-sex couples as opposed to opposite-sex ones, and found that those practically affected by the prohibition were almost exclusively homosexuals. 85 This impact-based approach has been preferred overseas recently, 86 and is likely to be applied in New Zealand.
When looked at in terms of impact, the refusal to solemnise a same-sex marriage also differentiates based on sexual orientation (and perhaps sex). A celebrant who refuses to solemnise a same-sex marriage due to religious objection to that marriage therefore treats a couple differently from others in comparable circumstances based on prohibited grounds of discrimination. 87 
c) Material disadvantage?
Will a refusal to solemnise a couple's marriage cause them a material disadvantage? Even putting aside the effect of a refusal on a couple's dignity, a material disadvantage could result from a refusal in some circumstances. Firstly, while a couple will usually have a wide choice of celebrants and Registrars willing to solemnise their marriage, in some situations there may not be any willing celebrants available, such as in more isolated areas. In such a situation, refusal could lead to a couple either having to travel to a willing celebrant, or bring one to them at their own expense. A court is likely find a material disadvantage in this situation, especially given the discussion of financial detriment as a material disadvantage in recent case law. 88 The couple may also belong to a religious body, and wish to be married by their religious leader in their church. The couple may feel a strong attachment to their faith and their religious community, and the refusal to have their marriage solemnised in their church by their minister may be a serious issue for them.
Most important though is the impact of a refusal on the couple's dignity. As Thomas J affirmed in Quilter, the fundamental purpose of section 19 is to protect human dignity.
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Denying a same-sex couple the same treatment based on their sex or sexuality "inescapably judges them less worthy of respect, concern and consideration" than opposite-sex couples.
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While the dignity-centred Canadian approach to discrimination was rejected in Atkinson, 91 it is likely that the effects of differential treatment on a victim's dignity will still be relevant to establishing a material disadvantage. Canadian authority remains useful to this extent.
The Canadian Supreme Court has noted that "human dignity is harmed by unfair treatment premised upon personal traits or circumstances which do not relate to individual needs, capacities or merits." 92 Furthermore, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Halpern v Canada commented that "exclusion [from the institution of marriage] perpetuates the view that samesex relationships are less worthy of recognition than opposite-sex ones. In doing so it offends the dignity of the persons in same-sex relationships." 93 Refusal to solemnise the marriage of a same-sex couple sends the same message, and has the same effect on the couple's dignity.
Also, in the case of a religious couple in the above example, the refusal may indicate that their union is invalid and unacceptable in the eyes of their religious community. This kind of exclusion has the effect of harming the dignity of the couple, and will constitute a material disadvantage.
In sum, despite the likelihood that willing celebrants will be available to a couple, any refusal is likely to cause a material disadvantage to a couple by excluding or stigmatising them, and thus affecting their human dignity. Practical disadvantages may also apply depending on the circumstances. Section 19 is therefore prima facie infringed.
Justified limitation?
Section 5 of NZBORA requires that a limitation on a right is both prescribed by law and can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 94 Section 29 (1) provision, and the limitation contained in it is prescribed by law. The question of whether it can be demonstrably justified is addressed below. The onus of proving that a limit is justified is on the party seeking to limit the right. (ii) does the limiting measure impair the right or freedom no more than is reasonably necessary for sufficient achievement of its purpose? (iii) is the limit in due proportion to the importance of the objective?
Put simply, section 5 justification "is essentially an inquiry into whether a justified end is achieved by proportionate means." As the following will explain, enforcement of couples' section 19 rights (by requiring celebrants to perform marriages contrary to their religious beliefs) would come at the expense of celebrants' religious freedoms, another set of rights also protected by NZBORA and international law. 99 Therefore, assuming the intended meaning of section 29(1) excludes NZBORA obligations, it can be assumed that the purpose of the limiting measure created by section 29(1) is to protect celebrants' religious freedoms. The following will explain the competing rights, and how they are prima facie breached if section 19 is not limited. Section 13 protects 'freedom from religion', in that it prevents improper imposition of beliefs on an individual. 111 The Canadian position established in R v Big M Drug Mart is that freedom of religion has a wider scope than this, including "absence of coercion and constraint", and is infringed when one is forced to act in a way contrary to his or her beliefs. 112 If a religiously objecting celebrant is legally required (giving effect to section 19 rights) to solemnise a same-sex marriage, he or she is being made to do something contrary to his or her beliefs. This requirement could be said to coerce his or her beliefs, and thus limit his or her freedom of religion. Although it is unclear whether the broader Canadian approach to this right would be adopted in New Zealand, if a couple's section 19 right is not limited, this may infringe a celebrant's freedom of religion.
ii) Inconsistency with section 15?
Moreover, not limiting section 19 would breach the celebrant's right to manifest his or her religion in practice. 113 'Practice' is defined in this context as "actions taken or avoided based on religious belief." 114 If a celebrant refuses to solemnise a same-sex marriage because it would be contrary to his or her religious beliefs to do so, this refusal is an action taken based on those religious beliefs. This view is supported by international authority. Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom dealt in part with the refusal by an applicant (a Registrar) to issue a marriage licence to a same-sex couple because of a conflict with her Christian beliefs. 115 While the applicant's claim was of discrimination, the ECtHR held that her refusal was "directly motivated by her religious beliefs" and came within the ambit of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (a similar provision to sections 13 and 15 of NZBORA). 116 The Court also held that the refusal by another appellant to counsel same-sex couples was directly motivated by his Christian beliefs, and a manifestation of them within Article 9. 117 A celebrant's refusal is therefore also likely to constitute a manifestation of religious beliefs in practice, under section 15. This right will be prima facie breached if he or she is unable to manifest his or her beliefs by refusing to solemnise a marriage on religious grounds.
iii) Sufficiently important?
Failure to limit a couple's section 19 rights would (at least prima facie) infringe a celebrant's religious freedoms. Dickson CJ in Oakes held that an objective must "relate to concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society" to be sufficiently important. 118 According to His Honour, one core principle of a free and democratic society is "accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs". 119 Protection of religious freedoms (another set of fundamental rights) is therefore a sufficiently important purpose to justify limiting section 19.
c) Rational connection?
The limiting provision must be rationally related its object. 120 An interpretation of section 29(1) excluding NZBORA obligations allows celebrants to refuse on any grounds. This protects their ability to refuse due to objection on religious grounds, and thus safeguards their religious freedoms. Assuming that the purpose of section 29(1) is to protect celebrants' religious freedoms, the limiting measure is rationally connected with this purpose.
d) Does the limiting measure impair the right no more than reasonably necessary?
Although perhaps intended to protect religious freedoms, section 29(1) read in this way allows refusal on any grounds, not just religious ones. Under this broad exemption, a celebrant could refuse to solemnise a marriage because, for example, the couple was Asian.
Prejudicial and discriminatory refusals not based on religious belief would be allowed under this interpretation, enabling a far greater incursion on the section 19 right than is reasonably necessary to achieve the objective.
117 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom, above n 115, at [108] . e) Is the limit proportionate to the importance of the objective?
This step is an "overall broad-brush question as to whether the limit is justified on the basis of how it is effected." 121 It requires that there is "proportionality between the effects of the limiting measure and its objective, so that the more severe the deleterious effects of the measure, the more important must be the objective it seeks to attain." 122 It must therefore be established that the limitation on section 19 is a "proportionate response" given the importance of protecting celebrants' religious freedoms. 123 It will be established that compelling celebrants to solemnise marriages contrary to their religious beliefs would place an unjustifiable and disproportionate burden on them, and section 19 should therefore be limited to enable celebrants to refuse on religious grounds. However, allowing them to refuse for any reason limits section 19 unnecessarily and is not a proportionate response.
It has been argued that adherence to religious beliefs and doctrine is as fundamental a part of the identities of religious objectors, as a sexual orientation is a part of the identities of homosexuals. 124 Both of these aspects of identity are central to a person's character, and
should not be subject to unnecessary state interference or coercion. 125 Coercing someone with strong religious beliefs to act contrary to those beliefs or preventing them from manifesting them, is oppressing a fundamental part of their identity in a similar way to preventing a homosexual from living according to his or her sexual orientation. Both parties' identities must be protected by a compromise if this is possible.
The Canadian Supreme Court has considered this issue. It held in Reference re Same-Sex Marriage that "absent exceptional circumstances", state compulsion of religious officials to perform same-sex marriages contrary to their religious beliefs would unjustifiably limit the right to freedom of religion in section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter. 126 It noted that the protection granted to religious freedoms under section 2 of the Charter are broad, 127 and clarified that this ruling applies to both civil and religious same-sex marriages. 140 Finally, the meaning must not be inconsistent with statutory purpose. 141 In other words, courts' interpretative mandate under section 6 must not be used as a "concealed legislative tool" to subvert Parliament's intended meaning.
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As mentioned above, an interpretation more consistent with NZBORA is that section 29 (1) does not oust obligations arising from NZBORA. Is this reasonably possible in light of its text and purpose? Here, assuming (in the alternative) that the statutory purpose of section 29(1) is to override obligations from NZBORA, this interpretation is directly at odds with the statutory purpose. It is therefore likely to be impermissible under the view of the Court in
Hansen that "section 6-mandated interpretation must always operate within the constraints set by statutory purpose".
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This effectively means this final step of the Hansen analysis is defeated by the intended meaning established at step one. However it has been argued that courts may, "at the extremes", adopt meanings that are contrary to the statutory purpose. 144 In Zaoui v AttorneyGeneral (No 2) , 145 the Supreme Court showed an apparent willingness to do this. The Court used section 6 and the presumption of consistency with international law to read down the powers of deportation conferred by section 72 of the Immigration Act 1987, requiring that they are exercised consistently with sections 8 and 9 of NZBORA. 146 This was despite "a number of strong indications within the scheme of the Immigration Act" that once a security risk certificate is issued, the individual concerned is to be deported. 147 It is therefore possible in light of Zaoui, that a court might be willing to depart from statutory purpose here.
However, it is unclear whether the courts are likely to take this approach, especially given the clear expression by the Supreme Court two years later in Hansen that the section 6 interpretive power is constrained by statutory text and purpose. As the law stands from
Hansen, a departure from the statutory purpose of section 29(1) is unlikely. Moreover, even if the courts are willing to adopt meanings contrary to statutory purpose in the future, it is also unclear whether this is the kind of 'extreme' case where they would be willing to do so. After all, in Zaoui it was the appellant's right to life at issue. It follows that this interpretation is not tenable.
Outcome
The intended meaning of section 29(1) does not override obligations arising through section 3(b) of NZBORA. Section 29(1) therefore only gives celebrants the power to refuse to solemnise a marriage if NZBORA allows such a refusal.
In the alternative, if section 29(1) on its intended meaning did oust NZBORA obligations, this would allow a celebrant to refuse for any reason (whether due to religious or moral beliefs or otherwise), which would infringe same-sex couples' section 19 rights in a way that is unjustifiable under section 5. An alternative meaning more consistent with NZBORA (that section 29(1) does not oust NZBORA obligations) would be unlikely to be adopted under section 6, and Parliament's intended meaning would be preferred pursuant to section 4. 19 right to freedom from discrimination. It is also clear from the above analysis that while allowing celebrants to refuse for any reason would unjustifiably breach section 19, allowing them to refuse based on religious objection to the marriage constitutes a justified limitation on section 19 and is lawful. Therefore, although section 29(1) does not oust obligations arising from NZBORA, it still allows a celebrant to refuse to solemnise a marriage on religious grounds, because such a refusal is permitted by NZBORA.
IV Conclusion
This paper has attempted to both examine the conflicting rights at issue, and explore the practical implications of section 29(1) for celebrants. In sum, section 29(1), on its proper construction, does not exclude human rights obligations arising from NZBORA. The provision therefore only allows a celebrant to refuse to solemnise a marriage if that refusal is consistent with NZBORA. A refusal based on legitimate religious beliefs is consistent with NZBORA, and section 29(1) therefore allows celebrants to refuse to solemnise same-sex marriages on religious grounds. As it would be demonstrably justifiable for all celebrants to refuse based on their own religious beliefs, section 29(1) provides a broader exemption than section 29 (2) . The fact that some celebrants do not fall within section 29 (2) is therefore no barrier to their ability to object on religious grounds. However, section 29(2) is of course useful to the extent that it provides clarity to organisational celebrants and ministers.
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